Third Reich Victorious Page 4

  Throughout the remainder of September, as German armored and infantry forces ground Poland beneath metal tracks and hobnailed boots, the Kriegsmarine ran amok in the Atlantic. U-boats savaged the Western Approaches, sinking thirty convoy escorts (including eighteeen fleet destroyers), three cruisers, and thousands of tons of merchantmen for a loss of only four submarines. CG II added three cruisers (Exeter, Ajax, and Achilles), four destroyers, and numerous merchantmen while operating near the mouth of Uruguay’s River Plate. It then refueled at neutral Montevideo before sailing for the North Sea and home. CG IV closed Halifax in mid-September, launching an air raid on its weakly defended harbor and shipyards before being warned clear of North American waters by the United States.22 CG III, however, established a new milestone in naval history on September 12: the first carrier versus carrier battle.

  Since September 1, CG III had been operating near the Straits of Gibraltar, interdicting British and French shipping (France had declared war on Germany on September 3). By remaining in the same area, Vice Admiral Gunther Lütjens confronted several risks, notably the concentration of enemy submarines and possible night attacks against his group by light forces from Gibraltar or French North African ports. However, he hoped to lure two British carriers, Furious and Hermes, from the British base at Gibraltar to the open sea, where they could be engaged.

  By dawn on September 12 his task force had evaded or destroyed five submarine contacts, and he ordered an unhappy withdrawal to the northwest. But at 1023 scout planes reported that British Force H (three battleships, the two carriers, two cruisers, and a dozen destroyers) was not only at sea, but on the same course as CG III, at a distance of only 100 miles! Lütjens quickly ordered a strike force launched, retaining only four Bf 109s for Combat Air Patrol (CAP). His attack wave had no sooner cleared the deck than his radar detected a covey of British planes inbound. The next half hour revealed the true weakness of British carriers—their planes. The Fairey Swordfish, a biplane torpedo bomber with a top speed of less than 150 mph, stood no chance against the modern Bf 109s. Of the twenty-three attackers, fifteen fell victim to the fighters before they began their attack run. The remainder persevered, two actually surviving to launch their torpedoes (both missed) before falling into the sea. Only fourteen of the sixty-nine British airmen survived to become German prisoners. Lütjens dined with them that night, one of the fliers recalling that the admiral had toasted them: “To the bravest men I have ever met, and damn the criminals who make you fly that deathtrap.”23

  Map 1. “A Date Which Will Live in Infamy”

  While the Germans rescued the downed fliers, their attack wave made contact with Force H. Brushing aside the pitiful British CAP, German torpedoes and bombs sank Hermes and severely damaged Furious, but not without a price. Of the fifteen bombers involved in the attack, seven failed to return to CG III, and three of those that did were so riddled with antiaircraft fire as to be usable only for spare parts. Clearly, attacking a prepared British fleet with such a small number of planes would cost the German light carriers dearly. Lütjens carefully considered that fact as Force H limped for home and CG III sped away to replenish its planes from its supply vessels in safety.

  The Polish campaign ended on September 27, a visible testament to the power of the German Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. When coupled with the successes of the Kriegsmarine, German victories offered Hitler the opportunity for considerable diplomatic suasion. In mid-October he hosted a meeting of several nonaligned European nations in Warsaw (amid the physical evidence of his nation’s military prowess), including Belgium, Luxembourg, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Hungary, and Romania. Hitler proposed the creation of a multilateral treaty between these nations and Germany. Each nation would enjoy favored trade status with the Reich and would benefit from its protection against external threats. In return, Hitler requested rights of military passage through signatory nations and long-term leases of land for naval and air bases. Finally, he warned that in these dangerous times no nation could afford to straddle the political fence, and that Germany would deal with its enemies as easily as with its friends.

  On October 19, 1939, Germany, Finland, Hungary, and Romania signed Hitler’s Danzig Pact. After a twenty-four-hour conquest of Denmark on November 11 (according to a statement by Raeder, “to defend the Baltic Sea lanes from probable Anglo-French blockade”), Norway and Sweden reconsidered their stance and belatedly signed the treaty. Of course, the interdiction of the North Sea trade lanes by CG I and various U-boat groups during October and November probably helped Norway reach its decision.

  On land, the winter of 1939-40 developed into the Sitzkrieg, or phony war, as the French slowly mobilized behind their “impregnable” Maginot Line. Meanwhile, British shipping, guarded by the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, convoyed the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) to France and Belgium. Twice the German Navy tried to interfere with the convoys, only to discover the vulnerability of both carrier groups and U-boats to concentrated enemy air power. CG I lost two destroyers and 28 planes, as well as suffering light damage to the Graf Zeppelin on December 6, while SG I lost four boats, including the expert Admiral Slevogt, in the shallow Channel waters in early November. This established the pattern for the surface war at sea over the dark months of winter. Where British land-based air operated, the German carrier groups did not. Outside that range, those groups operated with a fairly free hand. In particular, the German Navy dominated the North Sea (especially after establishing its own land-based air in Denmark and Norway) and the Atlantic-Mediterranean shipping lanes.

  Desperate to open the shipping lanes to the Mediterranean, allied surface forces sortied against the Kriegsmarine four times, losing two battleships, the only French carrier, four cruisers, and sixteen destroyers in exchange for a German cruiser and two destroyers (all three lost to French carrier planes). British and French submarines fared just as badly, with twenty lost in the area over the winter months. Unknown to the allies, the excellent German radar almost always identified the submarines before they submerged to attack, and operators immediately vectored destroyers against the would-be assailants.

  The North Sea presented a different set of problems for both sides. In mid-October, Hitler had declared the North Sea—Baltic sea lane an open trade route, as long as merchant ships kept their bows pointed away from England. In addition, he removed all port duties and tariffs on goods entering Germany. American industrialists could not resist the strong profits in a lane not threatened by the U-boats operating near the British Isles. German trade with the United States boomed, while trade with Britain declined. Unless the Royal Navy could regain control of the North Sea, it could not stop the trade. Worse, the accidental torpedoing of an American luxury liner by HMS Sealion on December 18 threatened to turn U.S. public opinion against Great Britain. Events in Europe stymied President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who strongly supported Great Britain but faced an election in 1940 and a growing wave of support for Germany among voters.

  In early January the Royal Navy attempted to take advantage of the short northern nights and the absence of Graf Zeppelin from CG I (in Germany for repairs following the engagement of December 6) by sending a Task Force composed of BC Hood, two heavy cruisers, and twelve destroyers into Norwegian waters. In near absolute darkness, an alert Scharnhorst used its radar to place accurate fire on the British force, then directed its ten destroyers in launching their Long Lance torpedoes into the inky night. Only one cruiser and five destroyers escaped this novel use of the new radar technology. For the gallant Hood, unscathed at Scapa Flow in September, luck had expired. A magazine explosion doomed the ship and its entire crew, as well as any chance for Britain to close Germany’s Baltic trade lanes.

  By May 1940 the British situation had deteriorated at all levels. The Royal Navy had lost seven capital ships, four carriers, twenty-eight cruisers, and ninety-six destroyers, most of these to U-boats while escorting convoys. With supply lines to the East Indies interrupted, shortages in
several strategic materials and petroleum products threatened to slow or stop British industry. British land forces in the Mediterranean operated on shoestring logistics, and British naval forces in Gibraltar and Malta hoarded precious munitions and consumables. From India to Singapore, Canada to Australia, raw materials were stockpiled and economic collapse threatened in numerous market sectors. And the United States, trapped between isolationism and German gold, remained unwilling to come to the aid of its old ally.

  On May 10, 1940, Britain’s struggle took a turn for the worse as Germany unleashed its military might on the Low Countries and France. By May 26, the BEF and isolated portions of the French Army stood with their backs to the Channel near the port of Dunkirk, praying for a miracle that never came. Pushed by Hitler to drive the hated British from the continent forever, the Wehrmacht, ably supported by the Luftwaffe, slammed ever forward, closing the last Channel port on May 29. General Erwin Rommel of the 7th Panzer Division accepted the official surrender of the BEF the following day. The Royal Navy, aided by many gallant civilian vessels, had managed to evacuate fewer than 30,000 British soldiers, most without even rifles, while suffering heavy losses from German land-based aircraft.

  France surrendered on June 22, Hitler dancing a jig as French representatives signed the terms of surrender in the same rail car in which Germany had been shamed in 1918. The terms were harsh: occupation by German troops for an indeterminate period, loss of the provinces of Alsace and Lorraine, disbandment of France’s army and air force, surrender of its navy to Italian forces (Italy had at last joined the war—after Germany had beaten France), reparations (the amount to be determined “at a later date”), and forced participation in the Danzig Pact.

  By mid-July the Luftwaffe had relocated its forward air bases to France. On July 28, Hitler unleashed Operation Eagle, designed to drive the Royal Navy from the Channel coast and the Royal Air Force from the Channel skies. Supported by three carrier groups from the North Sea, the German Air Force smashed shipping and repair facilities as well as major airfields throughout eastern England. On August 23, Prime Minister Winston Churchill quietly ordered the remnants of the Home Fleet to Canada, then broke the news to Parliament with those famous words, “Sometimes blood, sweat, and tears are of little avail …”

  In the early morning hours of September 18, 1940, English residents near the coasts of Sussex woke to the sound of numerous planes flying inland. Many rushed to their cellars, waiting for the inevitable bombs. But this time the German payloads fell softly from the sky. Parachutists of the Wehrmacht’s veteran 7th Flieger Division seized critical road junctions and towns, isolating a long stretch of England’s coastline, while their comrades of the SS Parachute Brigade dropped directly (and with heavy casualties) onto four British airfields, allowing the rapid deployment of reinforcements from the Wehrmacht’s 22nd Air Landing Division. At dawn, units of the British Home Guard, supported by the pitifully few remnants of the regular army gutted at Dunkirk, watched with horror as German tanks swam from the sea alongside the flat-bottomed landing craft of the SS Liebstandarte and Das Reich Divisions.24 The British troops fought bravely, but short of experience and equipment, and isolated by the German parachutists to their rear, the issue was never in doubt. By the end of the day, SS troopers from the beaches had linked with their comrades from the skies, securing a perimeter that included the port facilities at Brighton and Worthing.

  Over the next two weeks, the SS slowly expanded the perimeter against determined resistance and piecemeal counterattacks. From captured air bases, the Luftwaffe dominated the skies. During that time, German armored units and heavy artillery rapidly off-loaded at the captured ports, while infantry battalions poured across the beaches. On October 2, the XXX Panzer Corps (two armored and a motorized infantry division) burst from the bridgehead to capture Portsmouth, then drove on to Bristol, isolating British forces in Devon, Cornwall, Somerset, and Dorset. The two divisions of the SS, strengthened by an armored and a motorized division, struck north to surround and isolate metropolitan London. Three days later the SS “Wiking” Division staged a successful amphibious assault on the mouth of the Thames estuary, isolating London from the sea. Taking advantage of the confusion attending Wiking’s landings, German forces of the SS corps completed the encirclement of the city on October 8.

  By the third week of October the British government was still refusing to surrender, despite the occupation of most of England by German forces. Hitler therefore ordered his army to reduce London. For a week, the city witnessed heavy fighting. Only when Churchill, the stub of a cigar clutched in his lips, died defending a barricade near Buckingham Palace, did British resistance finally cease.

  A puppet government, formed by Hitler, signed the formal surrender on November 11, 1940, on the deck of the cruiser Wiesbaden in Scapa Flow. Reduced to a third-rate power under permanent German garrison, Britain was not even allowed to join the Danzig Pact. Though scattered fighting continued in former British protectorates around the Mediterranean basin for several months (and a resistance movement would plague Germany for many years), the opening episodes of World War II in Europe had ended.

  The Kriegsmarine continued to grow through 1945, earning additional glory while supporting the seizure of the Azores and the occupation of South Africa in 1941. Germany remained neutral after the Japanese surprise attack on the United States in December of that year, its relations with the United States souring only after Germany seized British Honduras in early 1942. In June 1943, amid growing concern at the threat of militant communism, Hitler invaded a prepared Russia. Though the navy’s carriers and U-boats contributed little to the campaign (other than escorting the troop ships of the SS, which fought bravely wherever committed, but notably at Murmansk, Leningrad, and Sevastopol), its Research and Development Section effectively ended World War II.

  In December 1939 a German scientist, Albert Einstein, had penned a note to Grand Admiral Raeder (Einstein’s niece was engaged to Raeder’s grandson) asking if the navy would be interested in a new explosive device based on “heavy water” research. Fascinated by the potential, Raeder spoke with Hitler, who immediately saw the possibility of combining the new explosive device with rockets then under development.25 In August 1945, as Americans struggled ashore on the Japanese home islands, Hitler obliterated Moscow (along with Josef Stalin and most of the members of his government) with two nuclear weapons mounted on V-3 guided missiles. Russian resistance collapsed as quickly as what little remained of its national government. World communism died overnight, an unsuccessful experiment never to be resurrected. The small states formed from the carcass of the USSR joined the Danzig Pact nations now firmly under Germany’s hegemony.

  Today, the Kriegsmarine lives on, though Hitler died in 1947, victim of diehard British assassin Ian Fleming. Karl Dönitz, as Hitler had specified, took his place as dictator of the Reich. Though Americans will remember his time as Führer in connection with the Cold War, the Honduras Missile Crisis, and the guerrilla war in Afghanistan, no German will ever forget that Dönitz’s first official act was to lead his nation in a month of mourning for the Little Admiral who had lifted the German people from the misery of Versailles to the glory of the Atomic Age.

  The Reality

  Hitler lost World War II in part because he never understood naval power. Thus, he allowed the Royal Navy to survive and the Kriegsmarine to wither. The lessons of history are as clear today as they were in 1939: as long as Great Britain and its naval power survive, no mainland nation will ever be able to establish hegemony over western Europe. Sea power must never be underestimated—and the same goes double for British spirit.

  To change Hitler, I introduced the one thing that he clearly lacked—a strong male role model, Stabsoberbootsman Günther Luck (and I am sure that readers with naval service will agree that no one can change a young man as quickly or as effectively as a senior petty officer). Luck, as with any effective leader, showed Hitler how to maximize his natural talents and taught
him to love something greater than himself—the Imperial Navy. He instilled discipline in the young man (a quality that Hitler lacked in reality). Perhaps most important, Luck’s death at the hands of the Royal Navy gave new direction to Hitler’s anger—a direction that spared Germany the self-destructive anti-Semitic impulse forever tied to the real Hitler, and forever a leading cause of Germany’s failure to win World War II.

  Bibliography